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Abstract
In this paper (a reappraisal of a subject already discussed in a paper presented at the
34° Congress of the ERSA in Groeningen) the thesis is argued that, despite some
favourable beginnings towards an integration between planning and regional science in
the past two or three decades, the marriage has not actually taken place, and an
"ambiguous relationship" has in fact developed. The reason for this is found in the
inappropriate scientific development of planning science and theory, and also in a
difficult adoption by all social disciplines (economics, sociology, political sciences) -
and thus also by regional science - of a rigorous and authentic programming approach.
Here we discuss the theoretical obstacles which have impeded the development of a
meta-disciplinarity of regional science (as Alonso hoped in 1968), and the passing from
the "positive-normative" approach, also prevalent in regional science, to a
"programming" approach. These obstacles are discussed from two points of view: a)
that of the "realistic" insufficiency of traditional (and thus regional) economic theory
with regard to decision processes (through the deep analyses of Walter Isard in his
"General Theory"); and b) that of the meaningfulness and usefulness of the decisional
use of descriptive-normative models, which still prevail in regional sciences (through
the more recent contribution by Bell, Raiffa, and Tversky, eminent decision theorists).
The paper goes into - through a critique of Isard's approach, on the one hand, and that
of Bell, Raiffa and Tversky on the other - outlining what is the methodological
paradigm which would lead regional science to guarantee a useful scientific basis for
planning, as always hoped, and according to the masterly teaching of Ragnar Frisch
(who has been rather neglected by more recent developments in regional modelling).2
The Programming Approach and the Regional
Science: A critical reappraisal
1. The Origins of Regional Science and Planning
That, from their very origins, regional science and economic planning have had such
a close relationship that one might even think they are identical, is so obvious as to risk
sounding banal. William Alonso, one of the most respected representatives of "regional
science", in an essay with the title Beyond the Inter-Disciplinary Approach to Planning
1
produced for a symposium on regional development held in Tokyo in 1968, in which he
criticised "interdisciplinarity" in planning and pleaded for a "metadisciplinarity",
claimed:
"Thus, every year several hundred scholars gather at the Regional Science
Association Conference and present and discuss papers. The participants may be
economists, geographers, planners, political scientists, sociologists, systems analysts,
and the like, but at these meetings they present and receive papers which share a
defined range of topics, a body of techniques, and certain standards of validation.
They share, to a large degree, a technical language and competence, and they read
much of the same literature. These meetings are not inter-disciplinary, but rather
meta-disciplinary, since the participants gather together not because of their diversity
but because of their commonality" (p. 171).
In considering the didactic aspect of the metadiscipline of planning, Alonso added
that  "there are concise and clear texts by which students may be trained in these
subjects ..." (p. 171); and indicated as "representative" of the metadiscipline the already
well known book by Walter Isard on the Methods of Regional Analysis: An Introduction
to Regional Science (1960)
2. "My point, in brief" - continued Alonso - "is that
especially in the hard social sciences, but also in the soft ones, there has begun to
develop a meta-disciplinary competence that rests in particular individuals, and that this
provides a better model for the incorporation of the social sciences into the planning
process than does the idea of an inter-disciplinary team." (p.172). It is undoubted that -3
in Alonso's view - planning and regional science should have been united on the
scientific and didactic plane.
1.1 Planning and Regional Policy as the Natural Ground for Integration
The natural union has also occurred however with the stimulus - from the post war
period onwards - of policies of regional riequilibrium, or simply regional policies, in all
Western countries, in those of Eastern Europe, and in many of those in the Third World
(although in the latter case the greater stress was certainly  on national development).
For the OECD countries an initial summing up of experience, and above all of the
capacity for development of regional policies from 1960 was made in the context of a
Study Conference that took place in Bellagio in Italy in June 1960. Walter Isard (in
collaboration with Thomas Reiner) gave the introductory paper on the theme of
"Analysis Techniques for Regional and National Planning"
3. In the first part of this,
"techniques" were not dealt with at all, rather the problems of the relationship between
regional and national planning were examined, with a clear awareness of the multi-
dimensionality of planning itself:
"Il faut pleinement tenir compte de ces diverses dimensions, si l'on veut établir un
bon programme régional de développement économique. ... La première dimension
du plan reflète le niveau de l'échelle administrative. Un premier niveau de
planification est représenté par l'echelon régional, un deuxième par l'èchelon
national; les zones urbaines inclues dans les regions constituent un troisième niveau
important ... Une autre dimension utile de la planification reflète la diversité des
activités économiques ... Une troisième dimension concerne l'ensemble des lois et
des structures politiques existantes ... Une quatrième dimension concerne le milieu
physique environnant ... un bon programme régional de développement économique
- comme d'ailleurs un programme national ou urbain - doit tenir compte de toutes
ces dimensions de la planification." (W. Isard & T. Reiner 1961 pp. 19 - 20).4
The paper continues with examples that demonstrate the need to integrate regional
plans with national ones in order to be able to operate efficiently at a national level.
It is only in the second part of the text that the authors synthetically illustrate what
they call "analytical planning techniques": i.e. comparative costs analysis, industrial
complex analysis, input-output analysis, costs benefits analysis. Research on models of
gravitation and interregional linear planning is mentioned without, however,
illustrations being given.
1.2  The Obstacles and Theoretical Gaps in the Development of Metadisciplinarity
In this contribution, we wish to uphold the thesis that, in spite of these beginnings,
that were very favourable to an integration between planning and regional science, in
the two or three past decades the marriage has not given clear fruits of integration, and
the metadisciplinarity to which Alonso aspired has not really developed. We would like
to explore why. Let us state immediately that we believe we can identify these reasons,
without doubt, in the actual crisis of planning, which - having failed in general in all
countries (first, second and third world) - has not produced even the sufficient
conditions for creating an adequate "scientific" maturity.
But, if this is true, we consider nevertheless that the obvious fruits of integration and
the development of the metadiscipline have not been had, also because of  an inadequate
scientific development of planning theory in general, and the difficult adoption of a
really "programming" approach in the development of the traditional disciplines of the
social sciences: economics, sociology, political sciences.
The "programming" approach (i.e. the decision-oriented approach), analysis based
on decision-making problems, and the overcoming of the paradigms of positive
economics (like those of positive sociology or positive political science), constitute a
compelling argument, that we would not like to confront here face on
4, but only with
reference to those aspects that concern the so-called regional sciences.
On the other hand, we would underline that, although the need for multi-disciplinary
integration (or for the metadisciplinarity postulated by Alonso) has not emerged only on
the regional or spatial scale, it finds here (as I have long claimed
5) a privileged scale of5
application. This is because of the fact that on the spatial scale behaviour and economic
factors  find more opportunity and greater reasons for becoming mixed up with
behaviour and non-economic factors, such as "social" and "political" ones.
Notwithstanding this, what we would call a clear " programming" approach has
consequently been lacking in regional analysis
6. This is because there has continued to
weigh heavily on it, a "neo-classical" conception of the economic system and of the
behaviours that regulate it, despite the fact (as mentioned) that it could have been the
sector of interdisciplinary encounter that was most "sensitive" to the needs of
metadisciplinarity!
In this contribution, we mean to discuss the theoretical "obstacles" that have impeded
the development of metadisciplinarity and the passage from the "positive" approach to
the "programming" approach (which in my opinion would be its essential condition).
We have faced them from only two stand points, which we consider nevertheless to be
fundamental:
(1) that of the "realistic" insufficiency  of traditional economic theory with regard to
decision-making processes; and
(2) that of the meaningfulness and usefulness of the utilisation of descriptive models for
decision-making.
These two standpoints will be faced with the support of two important theoretical
contributions by authors who come from the same disciplines being discussed here, and
whose critical evaluation - for this reason - seems, in our opinion, to have particular
importance
7. For regional science, Walter Isard (who, it can be said, was its founder,
even from the point of view of its scientific community); and, for  decision-making
theory, Howard Raiffa, who was,  along  with others, one of its most authoritative
analysts.6
2. The Realistic Insufficiency of Traditional Economic Theory with Regard to
Decision-Making Processes
Traditional economic theory ( and consequently the location theory,  from which
regional or spatial economics have taken their cue) was discussed, among others, by
Isard, in his most important work: the General Theory (of 1969)
8. In order to deal with
the theme among regional scientists, I believe it is correct to favour reference to Isard,
in preference to any other author
9.
“It has become increasingly evident to those of us in economics, regional science,
and other social sciences that our applied research relating to both planning and
policy-making suffers greatly from our inadequate ability to project behavior. True,
we have developed some relatively strong analyses such as the marginal approach in
economic and location theory, and strong operational techniques such as comparative
cost, industrial complex, and interregional linear programming. But these have been
based on such postulates as a one-state-of-the-environment world and profit
maximisation. Unfortunately, these postulates and others associated with them lead
to theoretical results and projections that cannot be said to correspond closely to
observed  behavior, at least insofar as we are able to describe and measure such
behavior." (p. 116).
Given this,  Isard examines the nature and characteristics of "some new sets of
postulates" that are hopefully more realistic and useful for the projection of behaviour.
He thus joins forces with a group of scholars who, after having had their fill of theories
and theorem founded on maximisation
10, recognise its practical lack of foundation and
propose its overcoming. And he sets about overcoming the failure of the traditional
approach, intending with "new sets of assumptions, hopefully to achieve a more
effective base for understanding and projecting behavior." (p. 117).
Where and how does Isard hope to find such "new sets of assumptions"? It is here
that Isard's vast research, of impressive proportions and which ranges over a good part
of the theories on social structure, is admirable for the architecture of this new "general
theory", whilst being perplexing for the inveterate belief in actually grasping that set of7
"more realistic" assumptions, that could make the projections for an operational
approach to planning and policy more reliable. In fact, one might ask (and at the end he
himself asks the same question, but, as we will see, only at the end) whether with the
"complication" of cases, by means of the relaxation of the simplifying assumptions, a
good service is done to the cause of the sought  operational projection of behaviour.
Without doubt, each case becomes per se - theoretically - more "realistic". But how can
we identify in the realities of observation ex post, and, even worse, in the realities of
projection ex ante, such a detailed correspondence with the theoretical case (and with its
all the more sophisticated system of derived assumptions and the system of behavioural
projections that results from it)?
2.1  The Relaxation of Assumptions and the Multiplication of Cases
In order to clarify better the perplexity, it is necessary to  first  describe, albeit
briefly
11, Isard's route. In the first part of his exploration, which was motivated by the
collapse of the meaningfulness of the assumptions of traditional theories, he begins to
explore all the possibilities of "extending" the usual decision-making models that
classical theory provides.
First, staying within the ambit of classical economic and location theory, as it refers
to individual behaviour, Isard proposes a new definition of it, by means of:
1. relaxing the assumption of a  "one state-of-the-environment- world", with the
introduction of "many states". Thus doing, he considers necessary "a complete re-
examination of the meaning of optimizing behavior and the building from the ground up
of a more satisfactory structure for decision-making". (pp. 17-18). This relaxing of
assumptions which, as mentioned, fits into the scheme of traditional economic theory,
allows for cases which - whilst being reduced to the bare essential by Isard himself -
already proliferate about ten types, with more or less important variations, both in the
system of assumptions, on the one hand, and in the projected behaviour, on the other;
2. the introduction of the variable "attitudes". Isard writes: "So long as only one defined
state of the environment could exist, economic and location theorists were not8
compelled to consider the attitude of a profit-maximizing individual". But "when in the
following section we wish to increase the realism of the analysis by admitting several
possible states of the environment, we find that we have to consider the individual's
attitude as another basic variable" (p. 130). What are these "attitudes"?
On the subject of attitudes and personality characteristics Isard refers to an already
established literature (Churchmann, 1961, Simon, 1957, Edward, 1961, and others). He
enriches and renders more sophisticated the axioms of this literature in his interpretation
of the effects of "personal style", "taste", "capacity of choice", etc. The essential types
of attitude that Isard considers are the following:
a.  "the 100 per cent conservative", who "is willing only to consider sure things" (p.
138);
b.  "the expected payoff calculator" whose  "objective is to maximize expected payoff"
(pp. 133-134);
c.  "the 100 percent conservative regretter", whose "objective is to minimize the level
of regret which certainly cannot be exceeded" (p. 134);
d.  "the expected regret calculator", whose "objective is to minimize expected regret"
(p. 135).
Already the cases arising from the various combinations of these "types" of attitude
produce the description of further cases. In Isard, summarising them, the following are
realised:
a.  "the 100 percent optimist": this is the extreme case of the person who is "certain that
for any given action he will receive the highest possible payoff" (p. 136);
b.  "the 100 percent pessimist": the other extreme with the person who is "certain that
whatever action he takes, the worst will occur, i.e. he will be left with the least
possible payoff “(p. 137);
c.  "the 100 percent conservative", who, as already mentioned, "is willing only to
consider sure things" (p. 138);9
d.  the "Hurwicz individual" (with a mixture of optimism and pessimism), who "looks
at the best and worst outcomes that can be associated with any action, and assigns a
weight (probability) to each of these outcomes" (pp. 138-139);
e.  "the equiprobable expected payoff calculator"; this type "is motivated to maximize
expected payoff, and who knows that each state of the environment has an equal
chance of occurring. Alternatively, he may have no information about the
occurrence of the several states of the environment and may simply assume that they
will occur with equal probability" (p. 140);
f.  "the 100 percent pessimistic regretter", who "is certain that whatever the action he
takes he will be left with the highest possible regret" (p. 141);
g.  "the 100 percent conservative regretter"; whose "objective is to minimize the level
of regret which certainly cannot be exceeded" (p.134);
h.  "the equiprobable expected regret calculator" (p. 141).
With those indicated above, the total number of cases introduced by Isard as
variations to the system of traditional assumptions, rises to twenty. Each has its own
system of assumptions, and system of projected behaviour.
2.2 The Extension of the Functions-Objective to "Noneconomic Commodities"
However Isard's research into new "more realistic" situations with the introduction of
"new sets of variables" does not stop here.
Iconoclastic fury directed against the inexpressive and unrealistic sanctuaries of the
(neo-) classical approach to "economic" behaviour, leads him to extend the analysis of
factors determining behaviour (of individuals, groups and institutions) to noneconomic
factors and objectives, by means of the incorporation in the classic "function-objective"
- the would-be expression of a function of social well-being (in its general version) - of
"non-tangible" variables (which Isard calls "commodities", in order to characterise the
market moment, and the nature of objects of "exchange" between individuals, groups,10
institutions, even if it is an exchange that does not take place through the traditional
market and, much less so, through the monetary market
12).
Isard lends himself to a stimulating classification of the so-called "noneconomic
commodities", which deserves to be recounted here, albeit briefly.
First of all, we should recall that before the list of noneconomic commodities that
Isard proposes as an instrument for making the decision-making system "operational",
and for which the general theory should be the instrument, he designed a structure of
the social system. He borrowed this structure from the well-known work of the
sociologist Talcott Parsons (who had had, in the decades following the Second World
War, a particularly strong influence in the American scientific community). Inheriting
the tradition of pragmatism from Dewey, Parsons developed, from 1951 onwards, a
"General Theory of Action", which he gradually perfected, in collaboration with
colleagues and students
13,  until arriving at the two volumes of the "Theories of Society"
in 1961
14. The "social act" in Parsons is always a combination, of unequal weights, of
four essential extreme or "pure" acts: that give rise to four subsystems of the general
social system:
a.  "the adaptive or economy subsystem, wherein  behavior involves primarily the
overcoming of environmental constraints and the active manipulation of the scarce
resources of both the environment and the social system in order to acquire
commodities (facilities) meaningful for a variety of system goals. Within this
subsystem fall organizations which have typically been designated economic firms";
b.  "the goal-attainment or polity subsystem, wherein behavior primarily involves the
setting of priorities or valuation of the diverse, heterogeneous goals of a complex
social system, taking into account the needs and directions of both the whole society
(or collectivity) and individuals and groups. In this subsystem fall 'political man' and
political policy-forming organizations";
c.  "the integrative subsystem, wherein behavior primarily involves, within a restricted
set of groups or individuals or both, the control of conflict and disruptive tendencies
to deviant  behavior and the promotion of harmony and  cooperation. In this11
subsystem fall 'integrative' organizations (social groups and institutions and certain
legal institutions)";
d.  "the pattern-maintenance subsystem, wherein  behavior involves primarily the
attainment of stability of institutional and interaction patterns and values, and, in a
more comprehensive sense than in the integrative subsystem, the management of
forces creating tensions among social, economic, and political organizations and
individuals with diverse internalized motivational commitments. In this subsystem
fall organizations such as religious and educational institutions" (ibidem, pp. 495-
497).
From the structure of the "social acts" framed in these four subsystems, and taking
inspiration from other very similar important works carried out by sociologists (such as
Bertram Gross and Alfred Kuhn), Isard deduces a list of 13 "noneconomic
commodities" that go to make up the usual lists of "economic" commodities.
This is not the place to delve into the general theory of the social system adopted by
Isard, but only where note should be taken of the quantity and quality of the "variables"
that he means to introduce in order to make the behaviour "more realistic", and not only
more "economic", of groups, organisations, institutions and individuals. It is a
behaviour that cannot be disassociated and disintegrated, by components or factors
which, whilst existing and having an influence on the behaviour, are always associated
from other factors (even if never in equivalent quantities).
The "noneconomic" commodities that Isard intends to include in the general system
of social transactions, and as a motivational base of behaviour (of organisations, groups
and individuals), are:
a.  the commodity "solidarity". It is the "integration of diversified perspectives within
an organization (collectivity, or group). It is a commodity which has reference to an
organization only, and is produced by interaction of individuals within the
organization, or by the interaction of the organization with other behaving units. It is
not a commodity which is capable of being possessed by an individual. It embraces12
cohesiveness (the strength of attraction of individuals to the organization) as well as
loyalty (faithfulness of individuals to the values and standards of the organization).
One hundred percent solidarity implies joint preference ordering";
15
b.  the commodity "power". It is the "ability to influence decisions of an individual or
organization. It may be both an individual or organization, through delegation or
otherwise. By this definition ... power embraces the ability to exercise authority, to
compel obedience, the exercise of authority implying an asymmetrical relation
between two behaving units"
16;
c.  the commodity " respect": it is the "weighted combination of status, honor,
recognition, prestige, esteem, and expressive social approval which an individual or
organization receives. The weights may be objectively specified, or simply
subjective";
d.  the commodity "rectitude": it is a "weighted average of religious and moral values
such as virtue, goodness, righteousness, responsibility, honesty, and integrity. The
weights may be objectively specified, or simply subjective. Its possession by an
individual is recognized by the individual, other individuals, and organizations";
e.  the commodity " affection": it is the "kindness, friendliness, love and goodwill
bestowed upon an individual or organization, by other individuals and organizations.
It embraces popularity";
f.  the commodity "sociality": it is the “pleasant feeling generated by interaction of
individuals in an organization or circle. It is a commodity which can be produced by
a collectivity only, and not by an individual. As a member of the organization, each
individual receives a share of this commodity as a return (anticipated or
unanticipated)";
g.  the commodity "participation" is the "involvement in the decision-making and other
activities of an organization, involvement that is associated with the active
'belonging to' an organization"
17;
h.  the commodity "well-being" is the "health and safety of the individual";
i.  the commodity "skill" is “proficiency in practice, whether in arts, crafts, trade or
profession; it also embraces the ability to be inventive and creative";13
j.  the commodity "enlightenment" is “knowledge and insight concerning the physical
environment and personal, social, and cultural relations";
k.  the commodity "achievement" is “accomplishment of an individual as evaluated by
that individual. It is a commodity that can be consumed by an individual only, and
its consumption may be associated with the removal of the tension associated with
n-achievement (need for achievement)" (ibidem, pp. 565-567).
In addition to the 11 "non-economic" commodities listed above, Isard gives another
two, whose definitions are principally orientated to the requirements of the general
theory that he will develop. These are:
a.  "love-tendered" is a "commodity which is produced only when an individual out of
pure love gives a family member, friend, or any other individual some commodity
of value ( e.g. corn, flowers, the commodity-affection), with the intention of
increasing the happiness (utility) of the recipient and without expectation of a quid
pro quo.   The  positive   outcome   of    the commodity-love tendered balances the
negative inputs of the commodities involved in unilateral giving, its consumption
accounting for inner satisfaction (utility) which the individual achieves from his
unilateral giving. Since the commodity- love tendered has utility to the individual,
and since utility is defined only over a commodity space, we treat the commodity-
love tendered as a real commodity. But it is one which is not marketable. Whatever
amount of this commodity is produced by an individual is directly consumed by
him";
b.  the commodity "sanctions" which "differs from most other commodities in that it
cannot be produced by  organizations or individuals. It is a commodity which
accrues to a participant (an individual or organization) in his interactions with
society. With each input-outcome plan (consisting of all commodities other than the
commodity-sanctions) that the participant may choose is associated a well-defined
amount of the commodity-sanctions, the magnitude of which is taken to reflect
society's net approval or disapproval of that plan. In this sense, the commodity-
sanctions is an atypical commodity; yet, we conceive it to have significance (utility)14
for the individual and to enter into the profit decisions of organizations. In this latter
sense, it is a real commodity; so we treat it as such". (ibidem p.568).
Finally Isard introduces, as a noneconomic commodity, the "vote" ; as a "resource
that is frequently perishable. It is an input in a situation where the output is a decision
(the decision being one of the several - at least two - alternatives available for selection).
It is an explicit unit expression of support or opposition to alternatives available for
selection" (p. 568).
2.3 The General Theory and the Accounting Frame for Decision-Making Processes
Having widened in this way the field of "commodities" exchanged and of the
motivations of the "social acts" and decisions and choices inherent in them, Isard
continues with an illustration of the "general, social, political, and economic theory for
a system of regions". Apparently he applies openly here the same theorems of the
general theory of economic equilibrium (of Walrasian origin) in the more recent version
of Arrow and Debreu (1954) and of Isard himself and Ostroff (1958).
But let us reconsider the previously mentioned perplexities. May a complex system
like the one provided by Isard, be a source for the protection of more realistic behaviour
which is thus advantageous for the construction of "decision-making models", with
which decision-makers (individuals, groups, and organisations, but above all the public
decision makers of planning policy) may take knowing decisions for the future on the
basis of appropriate decision-making models founded on them?
In order to make the decision-making procedures more "realistic", passing from the
already seen schemes with a single participant to those with two participants and finally
to those with "n-participants", Isard lists a good 77 (!)  different cases of decision
situations, with as many  assumption systems (now abandoned, then recreated) and
behavioural projections (so obviously theoretical as to have only an academic value).
And this - note - with the condition of excluding another series of "cases" that would be
implied if one was to free oneself from a great number of "implicit" assumptions; and
ultimately with the condition that we consider really working the presence of decision15
factors coming from the "market" of "noneconomic commodities":  those commodities
which - in truth - have not been brought into play in the analysis of decision processes,
but only in the still very approximate architecture of a general accounting system (the
multi-regional, social, political economic accounting frame).
Isard himself glimpses the reason for a certain perplexity concerning the "decision
analysis" carried forward so far in his breathless quest for greater "realism". In the
conclusion to his gigantic work, in the last chapter (Chapter 16) which is dedicated to a
"retrospect and prospect on some critical areas for future research" Isard thus writes:
"True the logical structure of the analysis of these chapters, with the associated
mathematical statements in the Appendix chapters, may appear impressive to some
scholars. To others, however, the list of unrealistic assumptions, explicit and implicit,
may appear still more impressive - and may lead them to view the derived logical
structures as refinements concerned with the consistency of a system, and which in
successive rounds of reformulation and restatement  increasingly turn in upon
themselves and grow more and more remote from reality." (p. 823).
And so, yes, I confess that  I, too, belong to this latter category of readers. I get the
impression that, in the quest for "realism", one ends up in situations that are yet more
unrealistic. But - and this is the point for us - only because an unsuitable approach is
adopted: that of "positive" analysis! In the programming  approach - i.e. that which is
linked to hypotheses of future behaviour, mainly of groups and governments, there is no
more need for this "extreme" realism - which seems to distance itself so far from reality
as to take on the aspect of extreme chance. In the programming approach - which is
totally aimed at an  ex ante decision - the classification of possible types of decision
behaviour must be addressed to the "reasonableness", to the theoretical probability of
certainty, that may render coherent and acceptable a complex set of attitudes,
motivations, decisions, which are made coherent by their policy-oriented explication,
negotiation, the adoption of co-operation procedures, and by the spread of information,
etc.16
Isard himself, on the other hand, shows he is aware, on more than occasion, of these
aspects: for example, when he realises that his own analysis of "interdependent decision
situations in political space" (§16.11)  is defective; and feels that there should have been
"introduced the judicial and regulatory processes of government units explicitly through
restricting action spaces, etc., and perhaps through imposing certain  co-operative
procedures" (p. 833). But we are in the logic of "explaining" behaviour and not
"hypothesising it" (which is subtly but strategically different).
If the multi-functional, multi-sectorial, and multi-regional model of Isard was only
motivated by the construction and elaboration of an  Accounting Frame (which Isard
himself considers the most important outcome of his elaborate general theory) we would
have nothing to say: a sufficiently taxonomic scheme would be had to construct a
system of economic and non-economic accounts, perhaps facing up to very frightening
problems of data collection, interpretation, the acceptance of statistical approximations,
but useful for a possible planning of decisions.
It is not inappropriate to say that Isard has provided with the general theory a very
important contribution to  planology, by means of the construction of a General
Accounting Framework in the Social System
18 (for which see Chap 13, and in particular
§13.12 where he gives a concise explication in table form). Isard's attempt aims, as said,
at extending "the competitive-equilibrium frameworks of Arrow and Debreu ... to a
broader system wherein we consider social and political commodities in addition to
economic  goods" (p. 599). Isard acknowledges moreover - at the end of his impressive
exposition -  that there is a "need for a more adequate accounting framework in the
political (polity or goal-setting) subsystem" (p. 836), and that stress was placed more on
theoretical aspects than on the construction of the framework. In spite of this, Isard's
scheme is a very important contribution, together with that of others (Gross 1966, Fox
1985, Drewnowski, 1974 and Archibugi, 1971 and 1974), to the schematisation of
accounting reference frames for planning, founded on extended  or integrated accounts,
that include not only economic accounts but also social, environmental, political ones
etc. as well.17
But the operationality of the accounting Frame seems to be founded by Isard on the
collection, analysis and projection of behavioural relations, and on the quantification of
parameters extracted from reality ex post to be projected in the future.
In this case, one gets the impression that the very criticism that Isard fears, of a
sophistication that goes round and round, seems plausible. The behavioural relationships
become in such a way the object of decision analyses, and not just descriptive ones.
They are analysed, in other terms, for their supposed or verified value not only for the
past, but also for the decisions that relate to the future; and this, in fact, represents an
error in methodology, that is risky for the false assumptions on which it would be
founded: i.e. the idea of being able to achieve "realistic" behaviour that as such may be
projected into the future. It is a question, in fact, of the much used "decision use" of
descriptive models.
On this point we would extend the analysis of the relationships between planology
and regional science (with reference also to the evaluation developed by the theorists of
decision-making processes, as we will see more clearly in Para. 3).
Furthermore, the analysis of general equilibrium (as understood in Isard's general
theory) is founded on a set of explicit or implicit conditions, that is so big that its
usefulness for planning is nullified. It postulates a harmony ex ante of any spontaneous
combination of factors, conditions, negotiating forces, decision processes, desires or
choices etc.; and corresponds more or less to the same harmony that any analysis ex post
is able to modelise - in the search for realism - on the basis of the events observed.
Thus, from the point of view of general equilibrium, the decision problem (aimed at
the future) it is not just that of the "projection" of "realistic" behaviour, but also that of
postulating "reasonable" behaviour (as Isard himself calls it on more than one
occasion
19), that has been elaborated with care as regards a) the decision situations of
the majority of social subjects (individuals, and also organisations, interest groups,
governments of all shapes and sizes); and b) the decision-making systems in force or
which are hypothetical.
This "programming" approach could be assimilated with the concept of a "utopian"
analysis (in the scientific sense of the word). On this point it may be of interest to recall18
what has been said by two authors of very different disciplinary extraction, but who
both see in the "utopian" overturning of the positive approach, the way out of the crisis
of economic science. The first, Bruno De Finetti, in his essay on " Utopia as the
Necessary Presupposition for any Meaningful Formulation of Economic Science"
20,
states:
"The utopistic formulation of economic science is made up of the examination of
the possibilities of efficient functioning of systems imagined as mental "utopistic"
schemes" (...)
The specific task of economic science, in the utopistic formulation that it is urgent
to promote, consists (...):
—  of translating into a precise form the desired things initially expressed in a more
or less vague and indeterminate way,
—  of examining the intrinsic consistency, and suggesting, if necessary, how to
modify them or integrate them, and;
—  of the delineation of forms of social organisation that aim at leading to desired
situations, with the examination and comparison of their aptitude to function in a
simple, easy and efficient, way, with a tendency thus to stability rather than to
deregulation that favours the rise of malfunctions and abuse.
(...) A Utopia will almost never be a model that will be realised in a practical
form, but vice versa, none of the many and varied possible radical improvements that
today's very poor forms and structures need, could be in reality conceived and
implemented without having first been conceived, studied and examined in the form
of Utopia." (p. 13-16).
(...) accepting the defined attitude, the 'value judgements' are the first
indispensable premise. Starting from the preference criteria inspired by them, and
bearing in mind the objective confining circumstances (...) one must seek and
determine the optimal solution that is theoretically achievable (in the absence of
institutional constraints). After which the institutional structure remains to be
identified, or rather the set of organisational-juridical-accounting conventions that
are to be chosen (...), bearing in mind that, in relation to the existing circumstances,19
this is revealed as the most suitable for the realisation in the most practical way of a
situation approaching optimality". (pp. 18-19).
And the second, Daniel Bell, in an essay on "Models and Reality In Economic
Discourse" (1981), states:
"The crucial question is whether the obverse of the rational is the irrational rather
than the non-rational, and whether or not non-rational motivations can provide a
valid assumption for an understanding of economic behavior i.e., the behavior which
seeks to enhance the wealth and welfare of mankind" (pp. 70-71).
"(...) economic theory should not be taken as a 'model' (or template) of how
human beings behave, for these will always be inadequate, but as a 'Utopia', a set of
ideal standards against which one can debate and judge different policy actions and
their consequences." (p. 80).
3. The Decision-Making Use of Descriptive Models
The decision-making use of descriptive models, as said, is the second aspect from
which we wish to further examine the ambiguous relationship between regional science
and planology. For this further step, we will be supported by the latest developments
had in studies on "decision theory", and, to be precise, a collection of essays edited by
Bell, Raiffa and Tversky (1988) aimed at the elaboration of descriptive, normative and
prescriptive interactions of decision-making.
For a long time decision theory has founded its models on a dichotomy: the
distinction between the " normative" aspect and the " descriptive" one of decision-
making (should be as opposed to is). Bell, Raiffa and Tversky, after twenty or thirty
years of developments in (neo-classical) decision theory (von Neumann & Morgenstern,
Simon, Luce & Raiffa, amongst the most well-known), place in doubt not only the
usefulness, but also the validity of the traditional dichotomy. They introduce a
"realistic"20
and "pragmatic" critique of decision that leads to a third approach, the "prescriptive"
one, which is similar in many ways - mutatis mutandis - to the programming approach.
They go so far as to say that when one discusses planning decisions one should conform
to this approach (at least for the planners, i.e. those who have to advise the decision-
makers). According to Bell, Raiffa and Tversky, descriptive analysis of decisions should
answer the following questions:
"How do real people think and behave? How do they perceive uncertainties,
accumulate evidence, learn and update perceptions? How do they learn and adapt
their behavior? What are their hang-ups, biases, internal conflicts? How do they talk
about their perceptions and choices? Do they really do as they say they do? Can they
articulate the reasons for their actions? How do they resolve their internal conflicts
or avoid such resolutions? Do they decompose complex problems, think separately
about component parts of problems, and then recompose or integrate separate
analyses? Or do they think more holistically and intuitively? What are the
differences in types of thought patterns for people of different cultures, of different
experience levels? What is the role of tradition, imitation, superstition in decision
making (or non-making)? How can 'approximate' real behavior be described? How
good are various mathematical models in predicting future behavior?
In short, descriptive analysis is concerned with how and why people think and act
the way they do. At times it may involve intricate mathematical  modeling and
require sophisticated statistical analysis. It is highly empirical and clinical activity
that falls squarely in the province of the social sciences concerned with individual
behavior. Scholars can study the domain without any concern whatsoever of trying
to modify behavior, influence behavior, or moralize about such behavior." (p. 16).
Passing to normative analysis, the authors observe that this activity is more difficult
to characterise since it presents different facets. In the first place, there is the idea that
the normative theory has something to do with the way how ideal, rational, super-
intelligent people should think and act. "Such analyses abstract away known cognitive
concerns of real people, their internal turmoils, their shifting values, their anxieties and21
lingering post-decisional disappointments and regrets, their repugnance (or zest) for
ambiguity or danger, their inabilities to do intricate calculations, and their limited
attention span." (p.16). The Authors feel that the "hallmarks" of  such normative
analyses are "coherence and rationality as captured usually in terms of precisely
specified desiderata or axioms of the form: if the decision maker believes so and so, he
should do such and such. As usual in any mathematical system, the power of any set of
desiderata comes from their logical, synergistic, joint implications".
"Axioms, basic principles, and fundamental desiderata are motivated by what
some investigator thinks is logical, rational, intelligent  behavior. Then like any
mathematical axiom system (such as sets of axioms for geometry) the academic
researchers play variations on the themes: what happens if this axiom is dropped, or
if this axiom is modified in such and such a way?
This exercise is rewarding if exercise  in  the mathematical implications are
profound or aesthetically pleasing. The exercise can also be rewarding if the
researcher can see a better concordance between the abstract system and some
aspects of behavior that is empirically verifiable or that the researcher imagines is
verifiable. Thus there is a dynamic interaction between the real world, imaginations
about the real world, and the abstract mathematical system. There are extant a host of
abstract models of decision making bearing some relation to decision making as it is,
or as it is perceived to be, or as it should be in someone's mind." (p. 17).
According to Bell, Raiffa and Tversky, “in the usual parlance, an abstract system that
purports to describe or predict behavior is called a descriptive model; an abstract system
that attempts to capture how ideal people might behave is called a normative model.
There is  a  little difficulty, - they write    “in categorizing some models as clearly
descriptive or normative.  One trouble is that some normatively motivated models are
often used, as mentioned above, as first-cut descriptive models. Other clearly
normatively motivated models go through successive modifications that try to make
more them more useful for descriptive and predictive purposes and then it may be22
difficult to say whether these modifications should be classified as normative or
prescriptive. On the other hand, some descriptively motivated models are occasionally
modified to come a bit closer to what some analyst believes is a proper norm for wise
behavior. And then the model falls into the grey area. Is it descriptive or is it
normative?" (p. 17).
Bell, Raiffa and Tversky recognise, rightly so, that on the subject there is noteworthy
logical confusion and that order must be put into the concepts.
In the studies that (we might say) belong to the programming approach strand, and
not to decision theory, a certain order in concepts has been made and not just recently.
The  surpassing  of  the ambiguous descriptive-normative dichotomy of the approach
which is nevertheless "positive", has allowed for more elaborate concepts in typological
classification of the "econometric" relationships between plan model variables. For
example, doubts have been expressed about the validity of the estimation of coefficients
founded on historic series; distinctions have been developed in conceptual
differentiation and, above all, in the use of equations (definitional, structural and
behavioural); the concept of "autonomous" relationships has been introduced; the
quantification in "observed" and "programmed" values has been articulated, etc. In short
a methodological area has been developed that some have thought to call
"planometrics"
21. The elaboration of these themes falls - obviously - beyond the scope
of this contribution, even if it constitutes - as one can easily understand - an
epistemological premise.
3.1 The Illogic of the "Realistic" Validity of Behavioural Projection
Let us leave aside for a moment the problem of cases in which a "hybridising" of
normativeness and descriptiveness takes place. And let us emphasise, in the passages
quoted, the radically different nature of the two approaches, more  for the different
meaning that is assumed with respect to the purpose of the analysis, than for their
intrinsic quality.23
If, in fact, our purpose is that of extracting from reality objective behaviour (leaving
aside its ethical or rational value) which has the characteristic of (relative) scientific
certainty, in order to construct upon it projections (as future replication) of this same
behaviour as a constraint on our (even "free") decisions for the future, then our duty
would be that of conforming only to descriptive analysis and - although imperfect - of
taking on only the behaviour indicated ex post. In this case, however, everything rests
on an assumption: that the behaviour - so "real" and so "unrational" - has the ("rational")
gift of replication. This assumption seems even more heroic than many "rational"
assumptions that render the normative models so "unreal".
If, on the contrary, our purpose is to understand the reality and behaviour that we
have recorded ex post in their raison d'être and motivations, and if we do not worry
about using the said knowledge because of their improbable future discounts, in a
decision process for the future, we will in this case try to be so "rational" in replicating
reality in all its details, in simulating it in all its conditions, constraints and states, as to
become highly unrealistic in wishing to project it in improbable and uncertain future
states.
The two types of analysis, normative and descriptive, and the respective models that
derive from them, must serve two completely different purposes: the descriptive one is a
type of analysis that can serve "decision-making" purposes, and the normative one is a
type that can serve "scientific" purposes.
The programming approach is that which overcomes the persistent equivocation that
has developed in economics, sociology, psychology, political science, and in many
derived disciplines, which are also very close to decision and planning processes (like,
for example, regional science), but which have a positivist imprint: the idea that one can
deduce in the behaviour of man and his social derivates (groups, organisations,
associations, and even governments) "laws" or "norms" of behaviour, upon which an
aprioristic theory and behaviour paradigms can be constructed, and be translated
perhaps into parameters between behaviour variables in the so-called decision models.
On this fallacious idea Gunnar Myrdal
22 and Ragnar Frisch made some masterly
observations a while ago that deserve to be recalled here. I will reproduce only one24
insightful passage by Frisch on the subject of the "half logic" which underpins the use
of predictive models in planning.
"In most countries the shift of viewpoint is, however, based on a kind of half-logic
which I have never been able to understand and which, I think, will never be able to
yield fundamental solutions. On the one hand one still retains the on-looker
viewpoint, and tries to make projections on this basis (growth models of the current
types). And on the other hand one will afterwards try to use such projections as a
basis for decisions. How can it be possible to make a projection without knowing the
decisions that will basically  influence the course of affairs? It is as if the policy
maker would say to the economic expert: 'Now you, expert, try to guess what I am
going to do, and make your estimate accordingly. On the basis of the factual
information I thus receive I will then decide what to do'. The shift from the on-looker
viewpoint to the decision viewpoint must be founded on a much more coherent form
of logic. It must be based on a  decision model, i.e. a model where the possible
decisions are built in explicitly as essential variables.” (Frisch, 1976a, pp. 91-92).
Unfortunately, in current usage "decision model" has ended up meaning any model
that is useful for taking decisions, among these included all the descriptive models used
when necessary.
It is my opinion that regional science is imbued with this mistake. In fact, in order to
avoid the "half logic" about which Frisch writes, it would be necessary to define as
decision models only those constructed on the basis of variables (and on the
hypothesised behaviour of such variables) that are strictly linked to the decision process,
and not antecedent to it. 
23.
And “general equilibrium”, (of which  a theorisation  is certainly effective,  so that
decisions are founded on the operational awareness of the complexity of the decision
problems) should be conceived not as a pre-condition, but rather as an outcome of the
decision process itself.25
3.2 The "Prescriptive" Approach and the  Programming Approach: Common
Pragmatic Bases
Returning to the main arguments of Bell, Raiffa and Tversky, they themselves - on
the basis of some acute observations on descriptive and normative models - conclude, as
has been said, that there is a third approach to be favoured in planning processes, which
resembles greatly that which we call " programming approach": the  "prescriptive"
approach.
"What should an individual do to make better choices? [The authors ask] What
modes of thought, decision aids, conceptual schemes are useful - useful not for
idealized, mythical, de-psychologized automata - but for real people? And since real
people are different, with differing psyches and emotions, capabilities, and needs,
good advice has to be tuned to the needs, capabilities, and emotional makeup of the
individuals for whom the prescriptive advice is intended. It becomes even more
complicated when individuals who think one way have to interact with experts who
think along  different paradigmatic lines, as, for example, between a rational
decomposer and a holistic intuiter." (p. 17).
It is clear that decision theory, which is anchored on the socio-psychological
foundations of decision behaviour, tends to categorize logical decision processes with
regard to the "individual", rather than with regard to the decisions of groups,
organisations, institutions, and perhaps of governments, with their range of
representativeness. And, as target people and clientele for their consultancy work,
decision theorists have managers mainly in mind. But this does not create great
differences of approach, mutatis mutandis, between the prescriptive approach, and the
programming approach that is principally aimed at conceiving and assisting decisions in
complex systems of social and community planning, and on decision-makers with
political responsibility.26
Let us underline some interesting elements of decision theory, having affirmed the
trichotomy, because it is very convergent with the need to overturn the approaches, as
they have followed each other in the relationship between "positive science" and
"planning science" (or planology).
Bell, Raiffa and Tversky conclude that the difference between the three functions of
choice models  - descriptive, normative, and prescriptive -  , ,  can be clarified by
examining the criteria by which they are evaluated:
"Descriptive models are evaluated by their empirical validity, that is, the extent to
which they correspond to observed choices.
Normative models are evaluated by their theoretical adequacy, that is, the degree
to which they provide acceptable idealizations or rational choice.
Prescriptive models are evaluated by their pragmatic value, that is, by their ability
to help people make better decisions." (p. 17-18)
The Authors state that "all three criteria are difficult to define and evaluate, as any
student of the philosophy of science knows too well". I totally agree with their remark
that "it is evident, nevertheless, that the criteria are different; an argument against a
normative model need not be an argument against a descriptive model and vice versa."
24
(p. 18)
4. The End of the Ambiguous Relationship between Regional S cience and
Planology?
In this contribution we wished  to illustrate our assumption that decision processes
must be based on decision models that are defined as such, not simply so that they can
be used for decision purposes - as can well be the case of the descriptive models - but
also so that they are constructed with regard to decision hypotheses. And we wished to
do this following the critical paths of two schools of thought that have distinguished
themselves for their great analytical work in the construction of models for planning:
regional science and decision theory.27
These paths are similar to those taken by those (the Author included) who have
committed themselves to defending a sort of "autonomy" in the programming approach
with respect to the theorems of classical economics (and in particular to the theorems of
regional economics), on the one hand, and to the theorems of decision theory scholars
based on the analysis of "human behaviour", and on its scientific projectability, on the
other
25.
The lack of clarity in the differences of approach, has created in fact much
incomprehension and many errors in planning practice, and  many models  of limited
usefulness and value that are described as "decision" models, because they are still
anchored to "descriptive" formulations; models that have come to assume more clearly,
in the light of today's considerations, the character of "pseudo-decision" models.
In the past numerous ambiguities occurred. And the problem of a developing a clear
methodological and epistemological foundation was not  understood, as it seems to be
understood  today  in light of    the further  interesting developments of the evoked
disciplines.
I think that a more intense debate on this theme would do nothing but improve
approaches to planning and support a more direct pragmatic efficacy in the strands of
study that refer to regional science), for a construction of a more precise methodology
of planning.28
                                                
1 Published subsequently in the Journal of the American Institute of Planners (W.
Alonso, 1971) from which the excerpts are taken here.
2  It was Isard's second important contribution to regional science, and concerned
"analysis techniques" (W. Isard, 1960). The first (from 1956) was on  Location and
Space Economy: A General Theory Relating to Industrial Location, Market Areas, Land
Use, Trade and Urban Structure (Isard, 1956), and was declared by the Author to be not
"operational".    It attempted to unify within "one conceptual framework the various
theories relating to agricultural location and land patterns, location and spatial
configurations of industry, supply and market area analysis, rent and urban land use
patterns, interregional and international trade, urban systems and the urbanization
process, with emphasis on transportation and distributions patterns" (Isard, 1969, p. vii).
Isard goes on to say that "the basic 'substitution principle' was a key concept, found to
be central in the several theories examined; and through graphic and mathematical
analysis, the several theories were interwoven into a more unified framework and each
further developed" (ibidem). But such a theory was not operational. Thus the second
volume was produced. However, Isard warns in the preface to the third and final volume
of his trilogy (which should have become a quadrilogy in the intention of the Author)
that in this volume "which presented the set of available tested tools and techniques,
emphasis was placed on those which could effectively contribute to the analysis of
urban-regional problems ...; the fields of sociology, geography, political science,
anthropology and planning were  underrepresented ..." (ibidem).
3  See W. Isard & T. Reiner, 1961.
4  For some years now in the international scientific community, a certain re-awakening
of theoretical planning studies has been manifest, which has given rise to important
steps towards new methodologies. Allow me to mention some writings by the Author
that bear witness to this (Archibugi, 1992a & b). It is worth remembering that a "First
World-Wide Conference on Planning Science" took place recently in Palermo (Sept.
1992), under the auspices of the United Nations University (Tokyo), UNESCO, and the
European University Institute of Florence, and that on this occasion the scholars who
attended decided to create a World Academy for the Advancement of Planning Science,
whose honorary presidents  were Jan Tinbergen and Wassily Leontief. For more
developed appraisal on the general “programming Approach” see Archibugi, 2000b.
5  See Archibugi, 1969 and 1974.
6  In his authoritative and lucid introduction to the well known volume on the progress
of regional economic theory (1986), Peter Nijkamp expressed the opinion that: "the
policy orientation of regional economic theories and methods deserves due attention.
Regional economic policy analysis is still an underdeveloped field and is often only a
derivative of notions from planning theory and economic policy theory." (P. Nijkamp &
E.S. Mills, 1986 p. 16). About “programming approach” see the cite Archibugi, 2000b.
7  We are dealing  moreover with disciplines that represent two strands of study  that
can be considered among the matrices of planology. For further reflection on
planology's matrices, the reader is referred to a work  in progress  by the Author
(Archibugi, first draft 1993).29
                                                                                                                                              
8  Walter Isard, et al., General Theory: Social, Political, Economic and Regional with
Particular Reference to Decision-Making Analysis, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1969 (pp.
1040).
9  This represents also a critical-historical contribution to the evolution of thought on
regional science.
10  Isard himself states with a certain sadness, how "most of the social sciences have
been concerned with one or more aspects or types of rational and optimizing behavior.
Much of economics concerns behavior designed to minimize cost and effort or to
maximize profits, utility, and the economic welfare of the social body. Much of political
science, especially the new behavioristic political science, emphasizes processes
whereby individuals and groups act to maximize, for example, their vote, their power,
their control over influence networks, or the probability of their retaining a  position or
status already achieved.  Administrative theory also deals with optimization, for
example in its emphasis upon efficiency and cost minimization in the performance of
functions or attainment of specific goals. Public policy formation (inclusive of political
economy) is easily interpreted as involving for each issue the selection of that
alternative which either minimizes or maximizes some measure or function within the
setting of numerous institutional constraints. A good part of psychology pertains to the
individual attempting to maximize satisfaction within a complex political-social-
economic (stimulus) environment which provokes responses and fosters, inhibits, and
otherwise influences drives, learning, and adaptation. Sociology investigates the
structure and function of social groups and institutions, many of which may be viewed
as optimizing certain objectives subject to restraining elements: for example,
maximizing friendship, morale, and pattern stability subject to spatial, economic, and
other prescribed constraints" (p. 117).
11  However, direct acquaintance with the volume is recommended.
12  See Chapter 12 in particular.
13  See T. Parsons et al., 1951, 1953, and 1957.
14  See T. Parsons et al. 1961. See also the collective volume on Talcott Parsons, edited
by Max Black, 1961.
15 Personally I have studied this commodity (“solidarity”) under a different point of
view: as factor of changing in the pattern of the “capitalistic” economy (and “society”)
toward a new “associative economy” or post-capitalist society. (See Archibugi, 2000a).
16  Ideas and specifications may be found on this "noneconomic" commodity in a vast
literature on policy science. Isard has referred to authors such as Banfield (1961),
Harsanyi (1962), Gross (1964) and Dahl (1957).
17  On this, see in particular the works by McClelland (1953 and 1961) and Gross
(1964).
18  For which see Chap 13, and in particular §13.12 where he gives a concise explication
in table form.
19  Although on this point Isard states: "It is difficult to define exactly what is meant by
'reasonable' in this context. For our purposes, we choose to adopt the approach
suggested by Luce and Raiffa" (ibidem, p. 842). Isard is referring to Luce & Raiffa,30
                                                                                                                                              
1958, p. 332. The guiding principles evoked here are briefly: "Efficiency ... Simplicity...
Normality... Strategy ... Pre-indeterminacy ... ". For further elaboration see ibidem,
§16.14 p. 842.
20  I consider this essay one of the most important Italian contributions of recent decades
to the progress of theoretical and methodological reflection in economics.
21  Thus  Zauberman with his  Aspects of Planometrics (1967). For a wide-ranging
"planological" examination of these distinctions, see the vast bulk of work by Ragnar
Frisch, and, in particular, the essays from the last period of his life that have been
collected  posthumously by F. Long (Frisch, 1976); and above all the systematic
treatment on the "use of models" in planning and decision, contained in the fundamental
work by Leif Johansen on macroeconomic planning (1977-78).
22  See the essay by Myrdal: How Scientific are the Social Sciences? (Myrdal, 1972).
23  Frisch in another writing dedicates himself to a typological outline of models for
planning (in an essay which constitutes one of the pillars of planning studies) (Frisch,
1976b).
24  It is not necessary to say that the task of constructing models of a prescriptive type,
above all in relation to helping political decision-makers to make better decisions, is that
of planology (freed critically and methodologically from the undue assumptions of
"neo-classical" behaviour theory, and also from other, more classic ones of "positive"
economy).
25  An important technical development in decision theory which, whilst being up till
now "extraneous" to the discussion between  the  "positive" approach and the
"programming" approach to decision behaviour, is that which goes under the name of
"multi-objective decision analysis". Howard Raiffa was one of the first to deal with the
subject (Keeney & Raiffa, 1976), but the best critical summation of the many versions
and uses of the method (which has great relevance for the estimation and modelisation
of preferences, and thus for planology) is given in an essay by P. Nijkamp & P. Rietveld
(1986). An excellent treatment of multicriteria analysis methods applied to planning can
also be found in Voogd (1983).  The multi-objective decision methods, in all their range of
types and application, have in any case done a great service to the development of the
programming approach.31
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